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COMMENTS
Toward a Uniform Rule: The Collapse of the




General verdicts are a staple of the American judicial sys-
tem.1 Juries frequently decide cases through general verdicts, in
which the jury applies the law as instructed by the court to its
factual determinations.2 But general verdicts create problems for
reviewing courts. Cases often involve multiple theories of liabil-
ity and multiple elements within each theory.3 The hybrid na-
ture of general verdicts-juries make factual findings and decide
the outcome without specifying anything beyond the final ver-
dict-prevents reviewing courts from determining the theory or
element on which the jury relied. If the jury instruction for one
of the theories was erroneous, a court reviewing the verdict can-
not determine whether the jury relied on that erroneous theory.
This problem extends beyond general verdicts, occurring even
when a jury answers an interrogatory of a single question that
t BA 2011, Brigham Young University; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chi-
cago Law School.
1 See Arthur R. Miller, 9B Federal Practice and Procedure § 2501 at 91 (West 3d
ed 1982) (noting that special verdicts and interrogatories are used less frequently than
the "time-honored general verdict").
2 See Black's Law Dictionary 1696 (West 9th ed 2009). See also Walker v New Mex-
ico & South Pacific Railroad Co, 165 US 593, 596 (1896) ("[A] general verdict embodies
both the law and the facts. The jury, taking the law as given by the court, apply that law
to the facts as they find them to be and express their conclusions in the verdict."). Con-
trast this with a special verdict, where the jury makes only factual findings on questions
submitted by the judge and the judge then decides the legal effect of those findings. See
Black's Law Dictionary at 1697 (cited in note 2). The most significant difference between
general and special verdicts for purposes of this Comment is that special verdicts allow
reviewing courts to see what factual findings the jury made, and therefore the appropri-
ate grounds for liability, whereas general verdicts do not.
3 Throughout this Comment, a general verdict based upon multiple theories, ele-
ments of liability, or defenses will be referred to as a "multitheory general verdict."
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contains multiple theories. 4 Even without multiple theories, a
jury could answer interrogatories but award damages in a lump
sum. The question of what to do with such verdicts-whether to
uphold verdicts when an adequate theory exists or reverse ver-
dicts on an inadequate theory-has troubled courts for centuries. 5
Historically, the common-law standards of appellate review
differed for civil and criminal cases. The civil rule, outlined in
Maryland v Baldwin,6 required appellate courts to reverse and
remand for a new trial if a general verdict could have been based
on an inadequate theory, even if another theory was legally and
factually adequate7 The criminal rule, on the other hand, al-
lowed appellate courts to uphold a verdict as long as one of the
theories was legally and factually adequate.8 This difference be-
tween the civil and criminal rules could lead to incoherent re-
sults if interpreted in absolute terms. In a civil case, for exam-
ple, a verdict could be reversed if one of thirty-one theories of
liability were not supported by the evidence, even if the remain-
ing thirty theories were valid.9 However, a criminal conviction
could be upheld even if the judge's legal instruction for one of
two theories were incorrect.
Perhaps due to this tension, courts have recently moved to-
ward a similar rule for civil and criminal verdicts. The criminal
rule now dictates reversing general verdicts when one of the un-
derlying theories was plagued by a legal error, similar to the ap-
proach in Baldwin.10 This shift in criminal cases has generated
significant confusion among the lower courts. Some courts still
adhere to a strict interpretation of the Baldwin principle in civil
cases, holding that an error on a single theory is grounds for au-
4 See Dougherty v Continental Oil Co, 579 F2d 954, 960 n 2 (5th Cir 1978) ("An
interrogatory containing multiple issues is really no better than a general verdict. Such
an interrogatory presents the same dilemma as a general verdict submitted to the jury
on two theories of law, one of which is incorrect.") (citation omitted).
5 See, for example, Grant v Astle, 99 Eng Rep 459, 466 (KB 1781) (Mansfield)
(questioning the rules governing appellate review of general verdicts).
6 112 US 490 (1884).
7 See id at 493.
8 See Claassen v United States, 142 US 140, 146-47 (1891) ("[lt is settled law ...
that in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on an indictment or infor-
mation containing several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is
good.").
9 See, for example, American Airlines, Inc v United States, 418 F2d 180, 195 (5th
Cir 1969) (finding that one of thirty-one theories of negligence was inadequate, but refus-
ing to reverse on those grounds despite the rule laid down by the Supreme Court).
10 See Stromberg v California, 283 US 359, 368 (1931); Yates v United States, 354
US 298, 311-12 (1957).
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tomatic reversal. Those courts maintain separation between civil
and criminal rules. Other courts have imported a criminal law-like
rule by upholding general verdicts in civil cases. Adding to the
confusion is the federal harmless error statute" and other harm-
less error rules,12 which require reviewing courts in both civil
and criminal cases to ignore errors, including both legal and fac-
tual errors, that "do not affect the substantial rights of the par-
ties."13 Harmless error analysis is an additional step to deter-
mining whether a general verdict should be reversed, taken
after deciding which rule-the civil or criminal rule-to apply.
Courts disagree on whether harmless error analysis should dis-
place the strict mandates of Baldwin and its progeny. These two
sources of confusion-the harmless error rules and the applica-
tion of criminal law-have led to inconsistencies both within and
among circuits.
This Comment argues for a single rule that applies in both
civil and criminal cases: General verdicts with a legal error-
such as an erroneous jury instruction on the law or an improper
admission of evidence-should be reversed unless the error was
harmless. General verdicts with a factual error-insufficient ev-
idence to support a theory-should be upheld unless the error
was prejudicial.14 This approach is already the rule in criminal
cases and should be adopted in civil cases based on the enact-
ment of the harmless error rules. Because federal statutes gen-
erally displace the common law, this Comment suggests that the
harmless error rules-which were enacted after Baldwin-
require courts to conduct harmless error analysis before revers-
ing a general verdict. Factual errors should be treated as pre-
sumptively harmless, 5 so verdicts containing factual errors
should be presumptively upheld under the harmless error excep-
tion. The application of a uniform rule in civil and criminal cases
would resolve lower court confusion by informing courts of when
verdicts can be upheld and whether courts can apply criminal-
case law precedent in civil cases.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I discusses Su-
preme Court cases analyzing appellate review of multitheory
11 Act of May 24, 1949 § 110, ch 139, 63 Stat 89, 105, codified at 28 USC § 2111.
12 Other sources of harmless error analysis include FRCP 61, FRCrP 52(a), and
FRE 103. See Part I.C.
13 28USC§2111.
14 In cases in which a verdict includes both legal and factual errors, courts should
treat the verdict as they would a verdict with a legal error.
15 See Part III.A.2.
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general verdicts in both civil and criminal cases. Part II explains
the confusion among the lower courts concerning the application
of Supreme Court precedent. Part III synthesizes the law to as-
sert that the civil and criminal rules have converged under
harmless error analysis. Based on this convergence and on poli-
cy considerations, this Comment argues in favor of a uniform
rule regarding the reversal of general verdicts.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON APPELLATE REVIEW OF
GENERAL VERDICTS
As early as 1711, English courts recognized different rules
for appellate review of general verdicts in civil and criminal cas-
es. 16 Under the common law, general verdicts in civil cases were
reversed if there was a single inadequate theory. For criminal
cases, general verdicts were upheld as long as there was one ad-
equate theory. According to one English court, the rules differed
because courts reviewing civil verdicts could not reapportion
damages since they did not know what amount the jury awarded
based on each theory. 17 This problem did not occur in criminal
cases, since judges making sentencing decisions would typically
rely only on adequate theories. 18
Over the past century, however, the law has changed. This
Part discusses the historical development of the case law regard-
ing appellate review of general verdicts, beginning with the civil
side and then moving to the criminal side. This Part then intro-
duces harmless error analysis and discusses its applicability to
multitheory general verdicts.
A. The Civil Side-Baldwin and Its Progeny
Well before the Declaration of Independence, English courts
reversed general verdicts in civil cases when a single count was
inadequate. In 1884, the Supreme Court held in Baldwin that
this rule governs in American courts. The rule, now known as
the Baldwin principle, states that if a legal error exists for one
16 Regina v Ingram, 91 Eng Rep 335, 335 (KB 1711):
In a civil action, where one part of the declaration is ill, and the jury find entire
damages, the judgment must be arrested, because the Court cannot apportion
them; but in indictments the Court assess the fine, and they will set it only ac-
cording to those facts which are well laid. If an offence sufficient to maintain
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theory of liability, then the general verdict must be reversed.19
The reason for this rule is that "[the verdict's] generality pre-
vents [courts] from perceiving upon which plea [the jury]
found."20
Baldwin involved the improper admission of evidence. The
plaintiff sued the administrators of the estate of his alleged fa-
ther, claiming that he was the deceased's heir because his moth-
er and the deceased had secretly wed. At trial, the deceased's
son-in-law testified that the deceased told him of the secret mar-
riage. A witness for the administrators then testified that the
deceased told the witness that his son-in-law was dishonest and
that the deceased did not trust him. The trial court allowed the
administrators' witness's testimony, and the jury returned a
general verdict for the administrators.21 The Supreme Court
held that the administrators' witness's testimony was inadmis-
sible as hearsay.22 The Court also held that the evidence was
material since it discredited a key witness for the plaintiffs, and
"[i]t is impossible to say what effect it may have had on the
minds of the jury."23 Outlining the common-law civil approach,
the Supreme Court offered the following rule: "If [] upon any
one issue error was committed, either in the admission of evi-
dence, or in the charge of the court, the verdict cannot be up-
held, for it may be that by that evidence the jury were controlled
under the instructions given."24 The Court reversed the general
verdict and remanded the case for a new trial.25
While Baldwin concerned a legal error, the Supreme Court
extended the rule to cover factual errors in Wilmington Star
Mining Co v Fulton.26 The case regarded the death of a miner in
a gas explosion. The miner's widow sued the mining company for
wrongful death under eight theories of liability, and the jury
awarded a general verdict in her favor.27 On appeal, the Supreme
Court assessed the evidence for three of the theories, finding that
there was insufficient evidence to support them.28 Citing Baldwin,
19 Baldwin, 112 US at 493.
20 Id.
21 Id at 493-94.
22 Id at 494.
23 Baldwin, 112 US at 494.
24 Id at 493.
25 Id at 495.
26 205 US 60 (1907).
27 Id at 64-66.
28 Id at 77-78.
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the Court reversed and remanded the case because it was "im-
possible to say that prejudicial error did not result."29
Wilmington is questionable in three important respects.
First, the Wilmington Court contradicted its own precedent in
following Baldwin. Twenty years earlier, the Supreme Court de-
cided a case that involved the same Illinois statute at issue in
Wilmington.30 The statute required a verdict to be upheld as long
as "one or more of the counts ... be sufficient to sustain the ver-
dict."31 The Court recognized the common-law rule-later adopt-
ed in Baldwin-but held that the Illinois statute, not the com-
mon-law rule, applied.32 It then held that because there were
"indisputably good" counts, there was no need to consider the
counts in question and affirmed the judgment.3 The Wilmington
Court, contrary to this precedent, applied the Baldwin principle
rather than the Illinois statute. Its justification was that the Illi-
nois statute did not relate to counts that were "vitally defective. 34
Second, the Wilmington Court did not determine whether
the trial court's error was material, as the Baldwin Court did. In
fact, the Court in Wilmington found that no evidence had been
introduced to support the three inadequate counts,3 5 indicating
that a reasonable jury would have recognized that the theories
were unsupported and would not have relied on them. Yet it still
found prejudicial error without any explanation as to why it was
prejudicial.36 This suggests that Wilmington created a rule that
errors in multitheory general verdicts are automatically prejudi-
cial. Such a rule diverges from the Court's analysis in Baldwin,
in which it explicitly found that influential material evidence
that could have swayed the jury was improperly admitted.37 The
Wilmington Court did not explain how submitting clearly un-
supported theories to the jury affected the outcome.
Third, Wilmington extended Baldwin beyond legal errors. The
Baldwin Court specifically limited its rule to instances of "the ad-
mission of evidence, or [ ] the charge of the court."38 Wilmington,
29 Id at 78-79, citing Baldwin, 112 US at 493.
30 See Bond v Dustin, 112 US 604, 609 (1884).
31 Ill Rev St 1874, ch 110, § 58.
32 Bond, 112 US at 609.
33 Id.
34 Wilmington, 205 US at 79.
35 Id at 77-78.
36 See id at 77-79.
37 Baldwin, 112 US at 493.
38 Id.
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on the other hand, brings factual errors within the purview of
Baldwin without providing any justification. These three prob-
lems highlight the larger concern about whether Wilmington
should be relied on by lower courts.
Also relevant to this Comment, Wilmington acknowledged a
difference between the civil rule and the criminal rule with re-
spect to appellate review. After finding prejudicial error, the
Court noted that if the case were a criminal case the verdict
could be upheld.39 Thus, as early as 1907, the Supreme Court
recognized that the treatment of general verdicts differed de-
pending on whether it was a criminal case or a civil case.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the Baldwin principle on
two other occasions.4o In both instances, the trial court judge
gave the jury incorrect instructions on the law. 41 As in Baldwin,
the Court overturned both general verdicts because it was im-
possible to determine whether the erroneous theory was the sole
basis of liability.42
B. The Criminal Side-the Shift to Distinguishing by Error
Type
Appellate review of general verdicts in the criminal law
originally took the opposite approach of Baldwin. Under the
common-law criminal rule, a general verdict could be upheld as
long as a single theory was adequate to support it. Over the past
century, however, the Supreme Court has altered the rule to fol-
low Baldwin for legal errors in criminal cases and has expressly
adopted a harmless error exception, which requires courts to ig-
nore trial court errors that do not substantially affect the rights
of the parties.
1. The common-law criminal rule.
Under the common-law criminal rule, a general verdict could
be upheld as long as one of the grounds for liability is adequate,
39 Wilmington, 205 US at 78.
40 See Sunkist Growers, Inc v Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co, 370 US 19, 29-
30 (1962); United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association v Halecki, 358
US 613, 618-19 (1959).
41 Sunkist Growers, 370 US at 24-25; United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook
Pilots Association, 358 US at 613-14.
42 Sunkist Growers, 370 US at 30, quoting Baldwin, 112 US at 493; United New
York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association, 358 US at 619.
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meaning that the ground was legally and factually sufficient.43
This was the settled rule in England in 1775. 44 The justification
for this rule was a presumption that "the court awarded sen-
tence on the good count only."45 This presumption stands in
stark contrast to the approach in Baldwin, which held that a
court could not make any assessment on the grounds for liability
because of the general verdict.46 The common-law criminal rule
is not an absolute bar on reversal, however. Because it is based
on a presumption that the verdict rested on an adequate theory,
evidence showing otherwise may be grounds for reversal. 47
Nonetheless, doing so will be difficult because of the general
verdict.
The common-law criminal rule was in force in America as
early as 1813.48 In Locke v United States,49 the Supreme Court
held that the fourth count of a multicount criminal case was val-
id.50 The validity of this count "render[ed] it unnecessary to de-
cide on the others."51 The Court did not provide any explanation
for why it was unnecessary to consider the other counts, but
seemingly adhered to the common-law criminal rule.
The Court applied the same approach in several subsequent
cases. In one case, it upheld a general verdict because the sen-
tence was not greater than what would have been imposed un-
der any single count.52 Because there was a single count to sup-
port the general verdict and the outcome would have been the
same regardless of whether the other counts were sufficient, the
Court upheld the verdict.53
43 See Claassen v United States, 142 US 140, 146-47 (1891).
44 See Peake v Oldham, 98 Eng Rep 1083, 1083-84 (KB 1775) (Mansfield).
45 Claassen, 142 US at 146-47.
46 See Baldwin, 112 US at 494.
47 See Claassen, 142 US at 146-47.
48 See Locke v United States, 11 US (7 Cranch) 339, 344 (1813).
49 11 US (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
50 Idat 344.
51 Id.
52 Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 619 (1919). See also Roviaro v United
States, 353 US 53, 59 & n 6 (1957).
53 Abrams, 250 US at 624.
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During the twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court
retreated from the common-law criminal rule. As the next Sec-
tion explains, the Court adopted a different rule when constitu-
tional or legal errors are involved.
2. Distinctions based on constitutional, legal, and factual
error.
The Supreme Court has abandoned the common-law crimi-
nal rule in some circumstances. Increasingly, the Court has
made distinctions based on the type of error involved, rejecting
the common-law rule for constitutional errors and legal errors,
but adhering to the common-law rule for factual errors.
In the first case to make this distinction, Stromberg v Peo-
ple,54 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction because one of
the theories of liability was unconstitutional. 55 The defendant,
Stromberg, was convicted under a California statute that made
it a felony to display a red flag in any public place if the display
was based on one of three impermissible purposes. 56 The state
appellate court questioned the constitutionality of the statute's
first purpose-"opposition to organized government"-as "oppo-
sition" could include peaceful and constitutional means. 57 Given
the state court's interpretation of the statute, the Supreme
Court held that the first purpose was unconstitutional.58 It re-
versed the verdict, holding that "if any of the clauses in question
is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot
be upheld."59 Because the jury might have convicted Stromberg
on unconstitutional grounds, the verdict could not be sus-
tained.60 Since Stromberg, the Court has applied this rule in
54 283 US 359 (1931).
55 Id at 368.
56 Id at 367-68 (listing the three impermissible purposes of opposing organized
government, inviting anarchistic action, and aiding seditious propaganda). The text of
then-California Penal Code § 403a was as follows:
Any person who displays a red flag, banner or badge or any flag, badge, ban-
ner, or device of any color or form whatever in any public place or in any meet-
ing place or public assembly, or from or on any house, building or window as a
sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invita-
tion or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a se-
ditious character is guilty of a felony.
Id, citing Cal Penal Code § 403a.
57 People v Mintz, 290 P 93, 97-98 (Cal App 1930).
58 Stromberg, 283 US at 369-70.
59 Id at 368.
60 Id.
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numerous cases to reverse a general verdict conviction that may
have been based on unconstitutional grounds.61
The Court has also used Stromberg to diverge from the
common-law criminal rule in cases that do not involve a consti-
tutional question. In Yates v United States,62 the Court extended
the Stromberg rule to apply to legal errors.63 The case involved
fourteen defendants who were convicted of a single count of con-
spiracy with two objectives, one of which was organizing a group
who advocated overthrowing the government with violence.64 On
appeal, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's defi-
nition of "organize," concluding that the word referred only to
the creation of a new organization and not to the continuation of
an existing group's activities.65 Because of this legal error, the
Court thought that "the proper rule to be applied is that which
requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is
supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impos-
sible to tell which ground the jury selected."66 The Yates Court
thus extended the Stromberg exception to reverse a general ver-
dict if one of the theories was legally flawed.
The Supreme Court subsequently limited the scope of
Stromberg and Yates. In Griffin v United States,67 the Court re-
verted back to the common-law criminal rule with respect to fac-
tual errors and declined to extend Yates beyond legal errors.
Griffin was charged with a single count of conspiring to defraud
a federal government agency. The government alleged two pur-
poses to the conspiracy: "(1) impairing the efforts of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to ascertain income taxes; and (2) impair-
ing the efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to
ascertain forfeitable assets."68 Evidence connecting Griffin to the
DEA object failed to materialize, but there was enough evidence
to implicate her in the IRS object. The judge instructed the jury
that they could convict her under either of the two objects of the
conspiracy, and the jury returned a general guilty verdict.69
61 For a list of cases applying the Stromberg rule, see Griffin v United States, 502
US 46, 55 (1991). The Court has declared that the rule outlined in Stromberg is "settled
law." Francis v Franklin, 471 US 307, 322-23 n 8 (1985).
62 354 US 298 (1957).
63 Idat 312.
64 Id at 300.
65 Id at 310.
66 Yates, 354 US at 312, citing Stromberg, 283 US at 367-68.
67 502 US 46 (1991).
68 Id at 47.
69 Idat 48.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by relaying the histo-
ry behind the common-law criminal rule, concluding that the
general rule is to uphold a conviction if there is one adequate
theory to support it.70 It then rejected the defendant's argument
that her verdict should be reversed according to Yates. While
noting that its adherence to Yates was not at issue in the case,7 1
the Court questioned whether Yates was an appropriate exten-
sion of Stromberg, stating that the cases cited in Yates did not
support reversing a verdict for a legal error. 72 However, as the
defendant was requesting an extension of Stromberg to factual
errors, the Court decided that Yates was distinguishable because
it regarded legal errors.73 Instead, the Court turned to other
precedent for the prevailing rule-"the verdict stands if the evi-
dence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts
charged"74-and affirmed the conviction. 75
This distinction between legal error and insufficiency of evi-
dence provides, according to the Court, a "clear line" of separa-
tion based on jurors' abilities: jurors are able to analyze evi-
dence, but not the law.76 As such, courts can presume that the
jury based its verdict on adequate grounds when the issue is in-
sufficiency of evidence, but courts cannot make the same pre-
sumption for legal errors. 77
The current criminal rule, combining Yates and Griffin, is
much different than the original common-law criminal rule. In-
stead of looking for a single valid count, the current approach
requires courts to apply different rules for different types of er-
ror: legal errors are governed by Yates and factual errors are
governed by Griffin. This demonstrates that the Court has
moved away from the common-law criminal rule and em-
braced-at least implicitly-the Baldwin principle in criminal
cases, thereby bridging the civil-criminal divide with respect to
legal errors.78 The only remaining difference between civil and
criminal review relates to the treatment of factual errors, with
70 Id at 49-51.
71 Griffin, 502 US at 56.
72 Id at 52.
73 Id at 56.
74 Id at 56-57, quoting Thrner v United States, 396 US 398, 420 (1970).
75 Griffin, 502 US at 60.
76 Id at 59.
77 Id at 59-60.
78 See, for example, Hedgpeth v Pulido, 129 S Ct 530, 531-32 (2008).
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Wilmington governing civil cases and Griffin governing criminal
cases.
Applying the relevant rule does not end the inquiry. Before
reversing a verdict, reviewing courts must engage in harmless
error analysis, as explained by the following Section. This ap-
plies to both legal and factual errors, and in both civil and crim-
inal cases.79
C. Harmless Error Analysis
Even if a reviewing court finds an error, it could still uphold
the verdict through harmless error analysis. In 1919, Congress
adopted a harmless error statute,80 later codified at 28 USC
§ 2111,81 which requires courts to ignore all errors that are
harmless. The statute reads in its entirety: "On the hearing of
any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give
judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."82
The purpose of the harmless error statute is to curb unnec-
essary reversals. In Kotteakos v United States,83 the Supreme
Court analyzed § 2111's legislative history and determined that
it was motivated by the perception that reviewing courts "tower
above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of
technicality."84 Reviewing courts would reverse verdicts based on
mere technicalities, which "enabled the guilty to escape just
punishment" through the "skillful manipulation of procedural
rules."85 To remedy this, § 2111 limits instances when errors are
reversible: the error must affect the substantial rights of the
parties.86
Although Congress was originally concerned with technicali-
ties, the harmless error statute covers more than just technicali-
ties. When Congress codified the 1919 Act into § 2111, it removed
79 See Kotteakos v United States, 328 US 750, 762 (1946) ("The statute in terms
makes no distinction between civil and criminal causes.").
80 Act of Feb 26, 1919, ch 48, 40 Stat 1181, 1181, codified at Judicial Code of 1911
§ 269, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch 646 § 39, 62 Stat 992.
81 Act of May 24, 1949 § 110, 63 Stat at 105. The original version of the harmless
error statute was included in § 269 of the Judiciary Code.
82 28USC § 2111.
83 328 US 750 (1946).
84 Id at 759 (quotation marks omitted).
85 Id at 762-63.
88 Id at 760.
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the qualifying word "technical" for errors governed by the rule.81
This broadened the scope of the statute to include errors that
are not considered mere technicalities but do not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. Because of the enactment of the
harmless error statute, the Supreme Court dismissed the prac-
tice of presuming that all trial errors are prejudicial.88
The Kotteakos test looks at the verdict's outcome and has
become the standard for harmless error analysis of nonconstitu-
tional errors in criminal cases.8 9 In determining whether an er-
ror is harmless, courts should ask "what effect the error had or
reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision."90
The Supreme Court outlined the following test:
If... the conviction is sure that the error did not influence
the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand. ... But if one cannot say, with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without strip-
ping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment
was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible
to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to sup-
port the result, apart from the phase affected by the error.
It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial
influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction
cannot stand.91
If a court cannot say with "fair assurance" that the verdict was
not "substantially swayed" by the error and is left in "grave
doubt," then the error is not harmless and the verdict must be
reversed.92 In other words, an error requires reversal when it is
"highly probable that the error had substantial and injurious ef-
fect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."93
87 See United States v Lane, 474 US 438, 447-48 (1986).
88 McDonough Power Equipment, Inc v Greenwood, 464 US 548, 553 (1984) ("We
have [I come a long way from the time when all trial error was presumed prejudicial."),
citing Kotteakos, 328 US at 759.
89 See David A. Shields, Note, East vs. West-Where Are Errors Harmless? Evaluat-
ing the Current Harmless Error Doctrine in the Federal Circuits, 56 SLU L J 1319, 1321
n 19, 1324 n 41 (2012).
90 Kotteakos, 328 US at 764.
91 Id at 764-65.
92 Id at 765.
93 Id at 776. See also Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637-38 (1993) (discussing
the Kotteakos standard). Brecht discusses the differences between nonconstitutional er-
rors, to which Kotteakos applies, and constitutional errors, to which a more stringent
2014]
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The harmless error statute applies to both civil and criminal
cases. The Kotteakos Court specifically found that "[t]he statute
in terms makes no distinction between civil and criminal caus-
es," and noted that at one point a Senate committee recom-
mended that the statute apply only in civil cases.94 While the
Supreme Court has not yet relied on the harmless error statute
in civil cases involving multitheory general verdicts, it has used
it in other civil cases95 and has implied that the Kotteakos stand-
ard applies in civil cases.96 Many lower courts conduct harmless
error analysis either as part of or in addition to the Baldwin
principle. 97
In addition to § 2111, several other sources dictate that
courts should conduct harmless error analysis.98 Both civil and
criminal rules of procedure require harmless error analysis.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 61, entitled "Harmless
Error," instructs courts that "[a]t every stage of the proceeding,
the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect
any party's substantial rights."99 Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure (FRCrP) 52(a), also entitled "Harmless Error," says that
"[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded."'100 The similarity of lan-
guage between these two rules further demonstrates that harm-
less error analysis applies in both the civil and criminal con-
texts. Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 103(a), which applies in
both civil and criminal cases, also requires harmless error anal-
ysis, permitting a party to "claim error in a ruling to admit or
rule applies as outlined in Chapman v California, 386 US 18 (1967). Chapman requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error did not
contribute to the verdict. Id at 24. Because this Comment focuses on legal and factual
errors, the relevant standard for constitutional errors is outside its scope.
94 Kotteakos, 328 US at 762 & n 15.
95 See Memphis Community School District v Stachura, 477 US 299, 312 (1986)
(holding that the trial judge's erroneous inclusion of a category of damages was harmful).
See also Shinseki v Sanders, 556 US 396, 407-08 (2009).
96 See Shinseki, 556 US at 407-08; Cornelius v Nutt, 472 US 648, 657 n 9 (1985)
(citing Kotteakos to support its definition of harmful error); McDonough Power Equip-
ment, 464 US at 553 (referencing Kotteakos before discussing FRCP 61 and § 2111); Tip-
ton v Socony Mobil Oil Co, 375 US 34, 37 (1963) (citing Kotteakos alongside § 2111 and
FRCP 61 in discussing whether an error was harmless). See also Shields, Note, 56 SLU
L J at 1328 (cited in note 89) (noting that federal circuits have applied the "effect on the
jury" test in both civil and criminal cases).
97 See Part II.A.2.




Appellate Review of Multitheory General Verdicts
exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of
the party."'' 1 All these form the basis for harmless error analy-
sis, and courts often cite to multiple sources in conducting harm-
less error analysis.102
A recent case outlines the Court's current use of harmless
error analysis for multitheory general verdicts in the criminal
law context.103 In Hedgpeth v Pulido,104 the defendant was con-
victed of felony murder by a jury.105 He applied for and was
granted federal habeas relief because the trial judge incorrectly
instructed the jury on one of the theories of guilt, which the dis-
trict court found had a substantial and injurious effect on the
verdict.106 The state appealed to the Supreme Court, and the de-
fendant argued that general verdicts should automatically be set
aside when a jury is instructed on both a valid and an invalid
theory.107 The Court rejected this argument, noting that harm-
less error analysis applies to instructional errors.10 8 It opened
the opinion by citing Yates and Stromberg as the relevant rule.109
The Court then noted that those cases were decided before it
recognized a harmless error exception, and that instructional er-
rors are now subject to harmless error review. 11o Acknowledging
that previous cases using harmless error analysis did not in-
volve a multitheory general verdict, the Court nevertheless held
that there was nothing about multitheory liability that would
prevent courts from applying harmless error analysis."' This
demonstrates that the Supreme Court is willing to apply harm-
less error analysis to multitheory general verdicts, at least in
the criminal context.
Lower courts have applied the harmless error statute to
multitheory general verdicts in a variety of ways. The next Part
101 FRE 103(a).
102 See, for example, Tipton, 375 US at 37 (citing § 2111, FRCP 61, and Kotteakos in
concluding that an error was not harmless); Asbill v Housing Authority of Choctaw Na-
tion of Oklahoma, 726 F2d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir 1984) (citing both § 2111 and FRCP 61
to conduct harmless error analysis).
103 See Pulido, 129 S Ct at 530-31.
104 129 S Ct 530 (2008).
105 Id at 531.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Pulido, 129 S Ct at 531-32.
109 Id at 530.
110 Id at 532, citing Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 9-15 (1999) (holding that in-
structional errors are subject to harmless error analysis).
111 Pulido, 129 S Ct at 532.
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explains the different approaches lower courts have taken with
respect to Baldwin and how courts have applied Griffin to civil
cases.
II. LOWER COURT CONFUSION IN CIVIL CASES
As the previous Part shows, the Supreme Court has shifted
the analysis away from the traditional common-law rules for re-
viewing general verdicts. This shift has generated significant
confusion among the lower courts regarding the rule in civil cas-
es. Specifically, there are two sources of confusion. First, Bald-
win is ambiguous about whether a general verdict with an erro-
neous theory can ever be upheld. Lower courts have taken
different approaches to the degree of confidence in the general
verdict required for a reviewing court to uphold the verdict.
Some courts uphold a verdict only if there is absolute certainty
that the jury relied on the adequate theory, while other courts
require only reasonable certainty.
A second source of confusion is the applicability of recent
criminal precedent to civil cases. Although the Court's analysis
in Griffin could apply to civil cases, the Wilmington Court previ-
ously observed a civil-criminal divide and offered its own rule for
factual errors in civil cases. Most courts have applied Griffin to
civil cases in varying degrees, but some courts have refused to
apply Griffin to civil cases.
A. Lower Courts' Reactions to Baldwin
Lower courts struggle applying the Baldwin principle. Alt-
hough circuit courts apply different harmless error tests, 112 cir-
cuits also disagree as to whether harmless error analysis should
apply at all. Circuits that follow the Baldwin principle fluctuate
between two main interpretations. The strict interpretation is
that a court must be absolutely certain the jury did not rely on
the inadequate theory. This essentially requires automatic re-
versal if any of the theories is inadequate. An alternative inter-
pretation is that a court need be only reasonably certain that the
jury did not rely on an inadequate theory. Other courts have ig-
nored Baldwin and created their own rules regarding review of
multitheory general verdicts. Whatever approach a court takes,
however, nearly all have created some exception to Baldwin's
112 See generally Shields, Note, 56 SLU L J 1319 (cited in note 89).
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reversal requirement. This Section discusses each of the main
lower court approaches.
1. Automatic reversal.
Most courts originally adhered to the strict interpretation
and held that the language of Baldwin requires automatic re-
versal if an error is found with one of the theories presented at
trial. In Farrell v Klein Tools, Inc,113 the Tenth Circuit held that
reversals of the type at issue in Baldwin and Wilmington are
automatic.114 The case involved a defective-product suit to which
the defendant offered two defenses. Both were submitted to the
jury, who returned a general verdict for the defendant.115 Find-
ing that there was insufficient evidence to support one of the de-
fenses, the court reluctantly reversed the verdict because it
could "[not] say with absolute certainty ... that the jury was not
influenced by the submission of the abnormal use instruction."116
Although the court found it "very unlikely" that the submission
of the inadequate defense was prejudicial, it reversed because its
precedent "le[ft] no room for harmless error analysis."11 Uphold-
ing the verdict therefore required "absolute certainty" that the
submission of the inadequate defense did not influence the jury. 118
This approach still has limited force. While some circuits
that previously applied the strict interpretation of Baldwin have
changed their approach,119 many circuits continue to adhere to
this interpretation, albeit inconsistently. A decade after Farrell,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that none of its previous precedent
"says that harmless-error analysis does not apply.120 The court
asserted that the question was really about "how likely must it
be that an instructional error was prejudicial for this court to
113 866 F2d 1294 (10th Cir 1989).
114 Id at 1300.
115 Id at 1295-96.
116 Id at 1298-1301 ("[B]ecause we consider ourselves bound by Smith and McMurray,
we hold that the district court committed reversible error in giving a jury instruction on the
defense of abnormal use which was not supported by the evidence. We do so reluctantly.").
117 Farrell, 866 F2d at 1300-01.
118 Id at 1301.
119 For example, the Third Circuit originally held that a general verdict must be re-
versed if it could rest on a claim that is unsupported by evidence, but later adopted a
harmless error approach. Compare Avins v White, 627 F2d 637, 646 (3d Cir 1980), with
Hurley v Atlantic City Police Dept, 174 F3d 95, 121 (3d Cir 1999).
120 Morrison Knudsen Corp v Fireman's Fund Insurance Co, 175 F3d 1221, 1236-37
(10th Cir 1999).
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reverse."121 Recently, however, the Tenth Circuit cited Farrell to
reverse a verdict when it was unable to tell what theory the jury
relied on.122
The First Circuit provides another example of inconsistency:
in 2001 it adopted harmless error analysis,123 but the following
year reverted back to the Wilmington rule,124 only to switch
again and apply "a generous harmless error analysis" a few
years later.125 The Eighth Circuit has also required automatic
reversal for errors in multitheory general verdicts,26 and other
circuits occasionally have as well.127
Some courts that require absolute certainty have still found
an exception-known as the subset theory-under which the
verdict can be upheld.128 If there was a separate, adequate theo-
ry whose elements were a subset of the erroneous theory, then a
jury that relied on the erroneous theory must have found that
each of the elements of the adequate theory was satisfied. Be-
cause a court in this situation can tell with absolute certainty
121 Id at 1237.
122 See Kellogg v Energy Safety Services Inc, 544 F3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir 2008).
See also Allen v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 241 F3d 1293, 1298 (10th Cir 2001).
123 Davis v Rennie, 264 F3d 86, 105-07 (1st Cir 2001) (applying harmless error
analysis to affirm the verdict).
124 Kerkhof v MCI WorldCom, Inc, 282 F3d 44, 52-53 (1st Cir 2002) (adhering to the
Wilmington rule over plaintiffs request to apply Griffin, but finding that the lower
court's denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion because the risk of prejudice
was slight).
125 Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary v QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc, 552 F3d 47,
72-73 (1st Cir 2009), citing Davis, 264 F3d at 109 ("Where, as here, the jury heard a le-
gally adequate instruction, which was supported by competent evidence, we will not as-
sume jury confusion or verdict taint.").
126 See Friedman & Friedman, Ltd v Tim McCandless, Inc, 606 F3d 494, 502 (8th
Cir 2010) (requiring retrial when a question on the verdict form did not differentiate be-
tween two theories, one of which was inadequate); Dudley v Dittmer, 795 F2d 669, 673
(8th Cir 1986) ("The rule in this circuit is clear that when one of two theories has errone-
ously been submitted to the jury, a general verdict cannot stand."). But see Mueller v
Hubbard Milling Co, 573 F2d 1029, 1038-40 (8th Cir 1978) (utilizing harmless error
analysis but reversing the verdict).
127 See Bennett v Hendrix, 426 Fed Appx 864, 866 (11th Cir 2011) (rejecting the trial
court's ruling that conducting a new trial is unnecessary because the outcome would
probably be the same); West v Media General Operations, Inc, 120 Fed Appx 601, 620,
624 (6th Cir 2005) (reversing general verdict because statement was erroneously submit-
ted to the jury); Crowell v Angelus Sanitary Can Machine Co, 2000 WL 991616, *3 (4th
Cir) (finding that the error was not harmless because the court could not tell from the
general verdict whether the jury relied on an inadequate defense, which makes reversal
automatic).
128 Brochu v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp, 642 F2d 652, 662 (1st Cir 1981).
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that the jury found liability under the adequate theory, reversal
is not required.129
Brochu v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp,130 the first case to ar-
ticulate the subset exception, involved a plaintiff who suffered
injuries after taking an oral contraceptive.31 She sued the drug
manufacturer under two theories: (1) strict liability based on de-
sign defect and failure to warn, and (2) fraudulent misrepresen-
tation.132 The First Circuit held that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support finding a failure of the duty to warn and
therefore did not have to decide whether there was fraud.133 Be-
cause the duty-to-warn theory was supported, the court conclud-
ed that if the jury based its verdict on the fraud claim, then it
must have also found all the elements establishing strict liabil-
ity; if the manufacturer misrepresented the side effects, then it
also failed to warn about the side effects. 134 Even though the
court could not determine what theory the jury relied on, it could
tell from the verdict for the plaintiff that the jury found every-
thing needed to support an adequate theory. The court therefore
upheld the general verdict for the plaintiff.135 But because the
subset theory requires an adequate theory to be a subset of an
erroneous theory, it is an exception that arises only rarely.136
2. Harmless error exception.
Automatic reversal can have undesirable results. Requiring
a new trial because an inadequate theory was submitted to the
jury, which the jury may not have relied on, can be both unjust
and a drain on judicial resources. 137 To limit reversals, many
courts have engrafted a harmless error gloss onto the Baldwin
129 Id.
130 642 F2d 652 (lst Cir 1981).
131 Id at 662.
132 Id at 653.
133 Id at 661-62.
134 Brochu, 642 F2d at 662.
135 Id at 664.
136 See Kern v Levolor Lorentzen, Inc, 899 F2d 772, 790 (9th Cir 1990) (Kozinski dis-
senting) ("Brochu involved a very rare situation and, in the few cases where it applies,
the Brochu rule is fully consistent with Baldwin."). For another example of the subset
theory, see Shepp v Uehlinger, 775 F2d 452, 456-57 (1st Cir 1985) (finding that a breach
of contract theory was a subset of an indemnification theory).
137 See McDonough Power Equipment, Inc v Greenwood, 464 US 548, 555-56 (1984)
(stating that requiring a new trial due to a juror's mistaken response during voir dire
would be "contrary to the practical necessities of judicial management reflected in Rule
61 and § 2111').
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principle.138 This exception allows a reviewing court to uphold a
general verdict despite the presence of errors if the reviewing
court is certain that the jury was not significantly influenced by
any of the erroneously submitted issues.139 Factors courts tradi-
tionally consider in determining whether an error prejudicially
affected a multitheory general verdict include: whether the error
concerned an issue that was dominated by another issue,
whether the dominant issue was legally and factually adequate,
and whether the error was likely to impact that valid issue.140
Courts introduce harmless error analysis through two ways:
the language of Baldwin itself and the harmless error rules.141
Some courts find that the Baldwin principle already included a
harmless error exception.142 Other courts independently add a
harmless error analysis to Baldwin, often through § 2111 and
FRCP 61.143
The first and quintessential case to find a harmless error in
the multitheory-general-verdict context, American Airlines, Inc v
138 See Muth v Ford Motor Co, 461 F3d 557, 564 & n 15 (5th Cir 2006) (listing cas-
es). See also, for example, Davis, 264 F3d at 105-07 (using the harmless error exception
to affirm a verdict despite insufficient evidence to support one of the claims); Hurley, 174
F3d at 121-22 ("[We are satisfied that no jury would have found the defendants liable
solely on the basis of the quid pro quo instruction.... Because any error in the quid pro
quo instruction could not by any stretch of the imagination change the verdict, we need
not reverse."); Braun v Flynt, 731 F2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir 1984) ("[A] general verdict can
be upheld, even when a claim erroneously has been submitted 'where it is reasonably
certain that the jury was not significantly influenced by issues erroneously submitted to
it."'), quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company v Berkley and Company, 620 F2d
1247, 1258 n 8 (8th Cir 1980); Mueller, 573 F2d at 1038-40 (utilizing harmless error
analysis but reserving the verdict).
139 E.. du Pont de Nemours, 620 F2d at 1258 n 8. See also Part I.C.
140 See Gardner v General Motors Corp, 507 F2d 525, 529 (10th Cir 1974) ("Although
we might well hesitate to affirm the judgments if duty to warn were the single theory of
liability we consider plaintiffs' other theories of recovery ... to overwhelm any potential
error in this regard."); Collum v Butler, 421 F2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir 1970) ("Error must
be viewed with respect to its relative effect on the results of trial. In our considered opin-
ion, the results of the present trial would not have been substantially affected if these
issues had not been submitted to the jury."); Roginsky v Richardson-Merrell, Inc, 378
F2d 832, 837 (2d Cir 1967) (upholding a verdict despite improperly submitted evidence
for fraud because "the jury's finding on [negligence] could not have been significantly in-
fluenced by admission of evidence on the fraud count").
141 See, for example, Asbill v Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,
726 F2d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir 1984). See also Part I.C (discussing the harmless error
rules).
142 See, for example, Asbill, 726 F2d at 1504.
143 See, for example, Hurley, 174 F3d at 121-22 (noting that Baldwin "does not
speak to the harmless error situation" and citing FRCP 61 to uphold a general verdict).
For discussion of the harmless error rules, see Part I.C.
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United States,144 involved a plane crash that killed fifty-eight
passengers. The family of one of the victims brought a wrongful
death claim against American Airlines. 145 After an eighteen-day
trial, the jury returned a verdict against the airline.146 On ap-
peal, the Fifth Circuit held that of the thirty-one submitted the-
ories of negligence, all but one was supported by substantial ev-
idence. The court acknowledged that Wilmington required it to
reverse "if it is impossible to say upon which counts the verdict
was based."147 However, the court found that "it is [ I] inconceiva-
ble that in the mass of testimony so clearly establishing negli-
gence in thirty other particulars this issue could have influenced
the verdict against American.148 Citing FRCP 61, the court up-
held the verdict.149
Some courts interpret the Baldwin principle as requiring
absolute certainty that the jury reached its verdict on the non-
erroneous theory, but still conduct harmless error analysis. One
such case that popularized the harmless error exception is Mor-
rissey v National Maritime Union of America.15° The case in-
volved a union worker who sued the union for arresting him,
claiming the arrest was an improper disciplinary action.151 The
trial judge failed to define "discipline" in the jury instructions,
and the jury returned a general verdict for the worker.12 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit held that the trial court erred in not de-
fining "discipline."'153 In deciding how to address this error, the
court observed that the general rule would be to reverse and
that "[t]he language used [in Baldwin] is generally quite abso-
lute."'154 It also took note of the harmless error exception, but
ruled that such an exception "must be kept within rather strict
bounds.155 Because it was not clear that the jury would have
144 418 F2d 180 (5th Cir 1969).
145 Id at 183.
146 Id.
147 Id at 195.
148 American Airlines, 418 F2d at 195.
149 Id.
150 544 F2d 19 (2d Cir 1976).
151 Id at 22.
152 Id at 22, 25.
153 Id at 26.
154 Morrissey, 544 F2d at 26-27, citing United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook
Pilots Association v Halecki, 358 US 613, 619 (1959).
155 Morrissey, 544 F2d at 27.
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returned a verdict for the worker in the absence of the error, the
court concluded that the error was not harmless and reversed.156
Other courts have interpreted Baldwin and its progeny to
contain a harmless error exception in the language of the cases
themselves and require only reasonable certainty that the jury
reached its verdict on the adequate theory. One of the most no-
table cases relying on this interpretation is the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Asbill v Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation of Ok-
lahoma.157 The court quoted the language from Baldwin, but de-
clared that "this holding does not paint with as broad a brush as
appears from the language quoted."158 Instead, Asbill held that
all trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis. The court,
contrary to previous courts who interpreted an absolute rule
from Wilmington, cited Wilmington to support a harmless error
exception: "A general verdict may be upheld if it appears that
the errors committed were not 'vital,' or prejudicial to the 'sub-
stantial rights' of the objecting party."159 It also cited § 2111 and
FRCP 61 to support the harmless error analysis.160 However, de-
spite the harmless error analysis the court reversed and re-
manded for a new trial because it was not "reasonably certain
that the jury was not significantly influenced by issues errone-
ously submitted to it."161
Many of these earlier opinions applied harmless error anal-
ysis but did not actually find that the error was harmless.162 Re-
cently, courts have been more willing to affirm general verdicts
under a harmless error exception.163 But inconsistency within
156 Id.
157 726 F2d 1499 (10th Cir 1984).
158 Id at 1504.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Asbill, 726 F2d at 1504, quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 620 F2d at 1258.
162 See Ryan Patrick Phair, Appellate Review of Multi-claim General Verdicts: The
Life and Premature Death of the Baldwin Principle, 4 J App Prac & Process 89, 111 n 89
(2002) (noting that at the time the article was written, only four courts had found a
harmless error).
163 See, for example, Tire Engineering and Distribution, LLC v Shandong Linglong
Rubber Co, 682 F3d 292, 315 (4th Cir 2012) (upholding a general verdict on damages de-
spite dismissing several claims because the error was harmless); Muth, 461 F3d at 565
(holding that the court was "reasonably certain" that the jury found liability under the
adequate theory and affirming the verdict) (quotation marks omitted); Davis, 264 F3d at
105-10; Pratt v Petelin, 2011 WL 3847022, *3 (D Kan) (citing dicta in Farrell to apply a
harmless error exception and deny defendant's motion for new trial), affd 733 F3d 1006
(10th Cir 2013).
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circuits prevents any clear consensus on what rule each circuit
follows.
3. Discretionary rule.
Some circuits have disregarded Baldwin entirely. The Ninth
Circuit created another way to avoid reversing general verdicts,
known as the discretionary rule. The discretionary rule allows
courts to use discretion to construe a general verdict as attribut-
able to a supported theory.164 Courts determine whether to use
this discretion based on four factors: the potential for jury confu-
sion from the error, whether the appellant's privileges or defens-
es apply to the count on which the verdict is sustained, the
strength of evidence supporting the adequate theory, and the ex-
tent to which disputed issues apply to the theories in question.165
This has been recognized as "functionally equivalent" to harm-
less error analysis.166 In creating this rule, the Ninth Circuit did
not cite any of the relevant Supreme Court precedent, including
Baldwin.
Kern v Levolor Lorentzen, Inc167 demonstrates the applica-
tion of the discretionary rule. The plaintiff sued her former em-
ployer for wrongful termination, breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and age discrimination.168 The jury
returned a general verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant
appealed, claiming insufficient evidence for each of the claims.169
The Ninth Circuit found that there was no evidence to support
the age-discrimination claim, but used the discretionary rule to
uphold the verdict. 170 Going through each of the factors, the
court determined that there was little chance for confusion be-
cause the age discrimination claim was not emphasized and was
offered only to explain the disparate treatment; the employer's
defenses applied to all three claims; the evidence for the contrac-
tual claims was strong; and basing liability on age discrimina-
tion would necessarily require a breach of contract. 171
164 See Traver v Meshriy, 627 F2d 934, 938 (9th Cir 1980).
165 Id at 938-39.
166 See Phair, 4 J App Prac & Process at 101 (cited in note 162).
167 899 F2d 772 (9th Cir 1990).
168 Id at 774.
169 Id at 775-78.
170 Id at 777.
171 Kern, 899 F2d at 777-78.
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This exception has received "vigorous and persuasive" criti-
cism.172 Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, dissenting in
Kern, advocated for automatic reversal.17 He viewed the majori-
ty's adherence to the discretionary rule as "overrid[ing] sub si-
lentio" the Baldwin principle, and criticized the majority for ig-
noring stare decisis. 174 Despite such criticism, the Ninth Circuit
still follows this rule. 176 Its current analysis is much less exten-
sive, however, and it tends to look only at whether there is
enough evidence to support one theory rather than engaging in
analysis of all four factors.176 Thus, instead of being a narrow ex-
ception to the general rule of reversal, upholding the verdict has
become the rule. 177
4. Two-issue rule.
The Seventh Circuit has also ignored the Baldwin principle
altogether and follows a rule similar to the common-law crimi-
nal rule: courts should uphold a general verdict as long as one
theory is supported.178 This is known as the two-issue rule. 179 The
court justified this rule by observing that even if the instructions
regarding one of the claims was erroneous, "it cannot be shown,
other than on the basis of speculation or conjecture, to have af-
fected the jury's decision, there being a totally adequate inde-
pendent theory upon which the verdict may have rested."180 This
turns Baldwin on its head since it requires affirmance rather
172 See Knapp v Ernst & Whinney, 90 F3d 1431, 1439-40 (9th Cir 1996). See also
David M. Axelrad and Loren Homer Kraus, The Federal General Verdict Rule: Conflict in
the Courts of Appeal, 43 Fed Law 43, 43 (1996).
173 Kern, 899 F2d at 782 (Kozinski dissenting) ("When there is insufficient evidence
to support one legal theory [ ] the entire verdict must be reversed.").
174 Id (Kozinski dissenting).
175 See Knapp, 90 F3d at 1439-40 (stating that while the Ninth Circuit's rule has
been criticized, it is nevertheless the law in that circuit). See also, for example, Woods v
Carey, 488 Fed Appx 194, 197-98 (9th Cir 2012).
176 See, for example, Goldberg v Pacific Indemnity Co, 405 Fed Appx 177, 180 (9th
Cir 2010) (citing Traver to uphold a general verdict without analyzing the four factors).
177 See Kern, 899 F2d at 791 (Kozinski dissenting) (listing cases in which the Ninth
Circuit cited Traver to uphold a verdict without doing the analysis, noting that "the ex-
ceptions have now submerged the rule").
178 McGrath v Zenith Radio Corp, 651 F2d 458, 472 (7th Cir 1981). See also
Kossman v Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp, 211 F3d 1031, 1037
(7th Cir 2000) ("[When a jury only returns a general verdict, we need only find support
in the record for one of the theories presented to the jury in order to affirm the jury
award.").
179 See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Power and the Process: Instructions and the
Civil Jury, 66 Fordham L Rev 1837, 1883 (1998).
180 McGrath, 651 F2d at 472.
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than reversal. The Ninth Circuit has also taken this approach
with respect to factual errors in civil cases, although it did not cite
Seventh Circuit precedent in doing so.181 This is the same as the
Griffin rule, but the Ninth Circuit's decision predated Griffin.
The above analysis demonstrates that lower courts are un-
clear on what exceptions, if any, apply to Baldwin, and the cir-
cumstances under which they apply. Not only do circuits disa-
gree with each other on whether there are exceptions, but each
circuit is internally inconsistent in its approach. Some circuits,
like the Seventh and the Ninth, have even ignored Baldwin al-
together and created their own rules.
B. Application of Criminal Precedent to Civil Cases
Courts also disagree about whether the rules established in
criminal cases can apply in civil cases as well. Before courts be-
gan to apply Griffin to civil cases, only a few courts relied on
criminal law precedent in civil cases. In one case, the Second
Circuit followed the harmless error analysis outlined in Morris-
sey, but used Kotteakos to define harmless error. 182 The Fifth
Circuit relied on criminal law precedents to reverse a general
civil verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support
one of the theories of liability.183 The court cited Stromberg as
providing the relevant rule, even though Stromberg was a crim-
inal case and Wilmington would have been directly applicable.84
The biggest division between courts is whether the Griffin
rule for factual errors-which allows courts to uphold general
verdicts-also applies in civil cases. The majority of circuits that
have mentioned Griffin in civil cases have at least used Griffin's
reasoning to support their decisions, and some circuits have even
181 See McCord v Maguire, 873 F2d 1271, 1273-74 (9th Cir 1989) ("When a general
verdict may have rested on factual allegations unsupported by substantial evidence, we
will uphold the verdict if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any of the allega-
tions."). See also Securities and Exchange Commission v Todd, 642 F3d 1207, 1213 n 1
(9th Cir 2011) (citing McCord for the proposition that only one factual claim needs to be
supported by substantial evidence).
182 Bruneau v South Kortright Central School District, 163 F3d 749, 759-60 (2d Cir
1998), citing Kotteakos, 328 US at 764.
183 Neubauer v City of McAllen, Texas, 766 F2d 1567, 1575-78 (5th Cir 1985), over-
ruled in Walther v Lone Star Gas Co, 952 F2d 119 (5th Cir 1992).
184 Neubauer, 766 F2d at 1575-76.
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cited Griffin as the relevant rule. Other circuits have refused to
apply Griffin to civil cases because it was a criminal case.
1. Courts that have applied Griffin to civil cases.
Courts have applied Griffin in civil cases in two ways: by
importing Griffin's reasoning regarding the role of jurors or by
referring to Griffin as the applicable rule. The Fifth Circuit was
the first to apply Griffin in a civil case. 185 It had previously cited
Stromberg in a civil case to reverse a general verdict due to in-
sufficient evidence.186 In Walther v Lone Star Gas Co,187 the Fifth
Circuit cited Griffin, which limited Stromberg, to overrule its
prior precedent. Walther involved a plaintiff who sued his former
employer for age discrimination. The trial judge instructed the
jury that statistics alone may be sufficient evidence, and the ju-
ry returned a general verdict for the plaintiff.188 The Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the instructions were "legally correct, although
not factually supported" because the statistical evidence was in-
sufficient.189 Although noting that a previous Fifth Circuit deci-
sion had relied on Stromberg,190 the court adopted the rule from
Griffin, holding that "we will not reverse a verdict simply be-
cause the jury might have decided on a ground that was sup-
ported by insufficient evidence. Instead we must assume that
the jury considered all of the evidence in reaching its decision."191
The Fifth Circuit later questioned the reasoning of Walther but
found it to be authoritative.192 The court recently applied the
Griffin rule again in a civil case to uphold a verdict, without any
reference to Walther.193
The Fifth Circuit has also extended the reasoning in Griffin.
It has used Griffin not only to uphold verdicts with factual er-
rors, but also to grant a new trial because of a legal error.194 The
court cited Griffin as holding that a general verdict is valid only
185 See Walther, 952 F2d at 126.
186 Neubauer, 766 F2d at 1575-78.
187 952 F2d 119 (5th Cir 1992).
188 Id at 125.
189 Id at 126.
190 Id, citing Neubauer, 766 F2d at 1575.
191 Walther, 952 F2d at 126.
192 Prestenbach v Rains, 4 F3d 358, 361-62 n 2 (5th Cir 1993) ("Although its reason-
ing may be questioned, Walther appears authoritative in our Court at this time.").
193 Advocare International LP v Horizon Laboratories, Inc, 524 F3d 679, 696 n 67
(5th Cir 2008).
194 Banc One Capital Partners Corp v Kneipper, 67 F3d 1187, 1195-96 (5th Cir
1995).
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if it was "legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds"
and reversed and remanded the case. 195 This interpretation mis-
applies Griffin, which questioned the reasoning of Yates, but ul-
timately distinguished cases involving legal errors. 196
The Federal Circuit has been more forthright in applying
Griffin to civil cases. Like Griffin, it has distinguished between
legal errors and factual errors. 197 In a patent-infringement case,
the court relied on Griffin's distinction between legal and factual
errors in affirming the jury's verdict.198 The defendant offered
prior art references to show that the patent was anticipated and
therefore not novel. 199 The plaintiff argued on appeal that it was
entitled to a new trial because each of the prior art references
constituted an alternative legal theory and at least one was de-
fective.200 The court rejected this argument, finding that the dif-
ferent prior art references were separate factual bases to sup-
port the single theory of anticipation.201 Quoting from Griffin,
the court held that evidence for at least one prior art reference
was sufficient to prove anticipation.22 Recently the Federal Cir-
cuit explicitly stated that Griffin applies in civil cases despite the
fact that Griffin was a criminal case, and identified other circuits
that it thought would similarly apply Griffin in civil cases. 203
The Tenth Circuit also recently treated Griffin as the rele-
vant rule in a civil case. 20 4 Similar to the Federal Circuit, the
court used Griffin to draw a distinction between legal and factu-
al errors, denying the appellant's request for a new trial because
he did not allege a legal error.205
195 Id at 1195, quoting Griffin, 502 US at 49.
196 See notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
197 See i4i Ltd Partnership v Microsoft Corp, 598 F3d 831, 849 (Fed Cir 2010) ("Dif-
ferent rules apply depending upon whether the flaw is in the legal theory or the evidence.").
198 Northpoint Technology, Ltd v MDS America, Inc, 413 F3d 1301, 1311 (Fed
Cir 2005).
199 Id at 1306.
200 Id at 1311.
201 Id.
202 Northpoint Technology, 413 F3d at 1311-12.
203 Cordance Corp v Amazon.com, Inc, 658 F3d 1330, 1338-39 (Fed Cir 2011) ("This
court and other circuits have applied [Griffin's] rationale to uphold general jury verdicts
in the civil context as well.").
204 See Pratt v Petelin, 2013 WL 4405694, *5 (10th Cir) ("We see no reason [the Grif-
fin] rule should not also apply in civil cases.").
205 Id.
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The Seventh Circuit has also applied Griffin in affirming a
civil verdict.206 In Eastern Trading Co v Re/co, Inc,207 the court
found that submitting to the jury defenses with no evidentiary
support would be an error that does not require vacating the
verdict. Instead, citing Griffin, the court observed that "[i]t can-
not just be assumed that the jury must have been confused and
therefore that the verdict is tainted, unreliable .... This is just a
case of surplusage, where the only danger is confusion, and re-
versal requires a showing that the jury probably was con-
fused.208 The court went on to hold that there was sufficient evi-
dence for the defenses submitted to the jury and upheld the
verdict.209
Other courts, including district courts, have also applied
Griffin in civil cases. 210 Most of these cases acknowledge that
Griffin was a criminal case.
2. Courts that have refused to apply Griffin to civil cases.
Some courts have declined to apply Griffin to civil cases.
Two years after the Supreme Court decided Griffin, the Sixth
Circuit took such a stance. In Virtual Maintenance, Inc v Prime
Computer, Inc,211 the court cited the Baldwin cases to support its
initial reversal of a general verdict.212 After that reversal, both
parties petitioned for a rehearing, and Virtual requested the
court apply Griffin to uphold the verdict. The court refused, cit-
ing Wilmington to hold that "Griffin, a criminal case, does not
alter the longstanding civil general verdict rule, ... a principle
to which this circuit has consistently adhered.213
206 Thomas v Cook County Sheriffs Dept, 604 F3d 293, 305 n 4 (7th Cir 2010) (citing
Griffin to support the rule that it can uphold the jury's verdict on a single adequate theo-
ry); Eastern Trading Co v Refco, Inc, 229 F3d 617, 621-22 (7th Cir 2000); Composite Ma-
rine Propellers, Inc v Van Der Woude, 962 F2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir 1992) (citing Griffin
for the rule that general verdicts can be upheld if one theory is adequate).
207 229 F3d 617 (7th Cir 2000).
208 Id at 622.
209 Id at 622-27.
210 See, for example, Bennett v The Home Insurance Co, 1993 WL 261982, *3 n 8
(4th Cir) (citing Griffin as the federal standard in reviewing challenges to general ver-
dicts); Agere System, Inc v Atmel Corp, 2005 WL 2994702, *17 (ED Pa) ('Though the Su-
preme Court's holding in Griffin took place in the context of a criminal appeal, ... that
principle is equally applicable in the civil context.").
211 11 F3d 660 (6th Cir 1993).
212 Id at 667.
213 Id.
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The Sixth Circuit was recently asked to uphold a civil ver-
dict under Griffin and it again refused. The court found that
"[b]ecause Virtual Maintenance has not been overturned by an
en banc opinion of this court or by a Supreme Court decision, we
are bound by it."214 This language might imply that the court fol-
lowed Virtual Maintenance only because it is precedent, but
might otherwise apply Griffin in civil cases. Another judge on
the Sixth Circuit cited Griffin in a dissenting opinion to support
his view that a general verdict can be upheld if there is one ade-
quate theory.215
The First Circuit has also declined an invitation to apply
Griffin in civil cases. 216 Noting that the Supreme Court does not
adhere to the Griffin rule in civil cases, the court proceeded to
apply the Baldwin principle.217 A few years later, the First Cir-
cuit again observed that the Baldwin principle applies in civil
cases and Griffin applies in criminal cases. 218 However, the First
Circuit has said that "it is not easy to explain the discrepancy219
and that Griffin "makes sense" when applied to cases that have
no evidence on one theory and sufficient evidence on another.220
Thus, both circuits that decline to apply Griffin in civil cases
have nevertheless hinted that they approve of its reasoning as
applied in civil cases.
As this Part shows, lower court jurisprudence for civil cases
is convoluted and inconsistent. Different circuits have created
different exceptions to the Baldwin principle and have disagreed
on whether and when Griffin applies in civil cases. The uniform
214 Loesel v City of Frankenmuth, 692 F3d 452, 468 (6th Cir 2012).
215 See Daugherty v Campbell, 33 F3d 554, 558 n 1 (6th Cir 1994) (Suhrheinrich dis-
senting) (citing Griffin in a civil case to support the position that one adequate theory is
sufficient to affirm a general verdict).
216 See Kerkhof, 282 F3d at 52.
217 Id ("Although it is not easy to explain the discrepancy, the Supreme Court has
not used the same presumption in civil cases."). However, the court found that the risk of
prejudice was slight and affirmed the verdict. Id at 53.
218 Gillespie v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 386 F3d 21, 30 n 7 (1st Cir 2004):
The general remand rule in civil cases, derived from [Baldwin,] has been reaf-
firmed in more recent cases. . . . The contrary rule in criminal cases involving
insufficient evidence, see [Griffin,] makes sense when one looks at the cases in
which the rule is often applied, e.g., [Griffin] (no evidence on one theory and
enough on another).
219 Kerkhof, 282 F3d at 52.
220 Gillespie, 386 F3d at 30 n 7.
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rule outlined in the following Part removes these complications
by providing a simple rule that applies in all cases: reverse for
legal errors unless harmless, and uphold for factual errors un-
less prejudicial.
III. A UNIFORM RULE BASED ON ERROR TYPE
As Part I shows, the criminal law and civil law approaches
to reviewing general verdicts have been converging, creating the
confusion in lower courts outlined in Part II. This Part synthe-
sizes the cases from both sides to propose a uniform rule for ap-
pellate review of multitheory general verdicts, applicable to both
criminal and civil cases: courts should reverse for legal errors
and uphold for factual errors. Since both sides already reverse
for legal errors, currently the only difference between the civil
and criminal rules is the treatment of factual errors, with crimi-
nal cases governed by Griffin and civil cases governed by Wil-
mington.221 Thus, the confusion among the lower courts can be
abated by resolving this difference.
To remedy this difference, courts should recognize that the
Wilmington rule has been displaced by the harmless error
rules,222 which preempts the common law. Courts should conduct
harmless error analysis, and under this analysis courts should
find that factual errors are presumed harmless. Because jurors
can be presumed to have reached their verdicts on factually ad-
equate theories, verdicts with factual errors should be presump-
tively upheld. This outcome is functionally equivalent to the cur-
rent criminal rule, which means that the civil-criminal divide
noted in Wilmington has converged based on the enactment of
the harmless error rules. Supreme Court precedent supports
this convergence, since the Court has applied criminal case law
in civil cases in other contexts.
Because there should no longer be a criminal-civil divide,
Griffin should apply in both civil and criminal cases. Applying
Griffin would create a simple, uniform rule: reverse general ver-
dicts for legal errors unless harmless, and uphold verdicts de-
spite factual errors if there is a single adequate theory. This rule
would resolve both sources of confusion courts have faced. It
would inform courts when a harmless error exception should ap-
ply and whether Griffin can be cited in civil cases. Courts should
221 See text accompanying note 78.
222 28 USC § 2111. See also Part I.C.
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look to this uniform rule as guidance in determining whether a
multitheory general verdict with an underlying error should be
upheld.223
A. Wilmington under Harmless Error Analysis and the
Common-Law Criminal Rule
Reliance on a strict interpretation of Wilmington-
automatic reversal for factual errors-is misplaced. The harm-
less error rules, notably § 2111 and FRCP 61, require courts to
uphold a verdict if the error was harmless, contrary to the origi-
nal analysis in Wilmington. The Wilmington rule has therefore
been displaced in favor of harmless error analysis in order to
comply with these statutes.
To determine whether a factual error is harmless, courts
should ask whether the error changed the verdict. Because ju-
ries can identify factually unsupported theories, factual errors
are unlikely to produce a different verdict. Thus, factual errors
should be presumed harmless, so general verdicts with factual
errors should be presumptively upheld. This matches the analy-
sis outlined in the common-law criminal rule.
1. The harmless error rules displace the Wilmington rule.
Wilmington, which held that factual errors in general ver-
dicts are "prejudicial," has been superseded by the harmless er-
ror rules. As noted earlier, the Wilmington Court did not con-
duct harmless error analysis in deciding the case.224 With the
enactment of the harmless error rule embodied in § 2111 and
FRCP 61, however, Wilmington can no longer stand for the
proposition that factual errors should be automatically reversed.
As a preliminary matter, courts should not hesitate to con-
clude that the harmless error rules displace Wilmington. Before
Wilmington, the Supreme Court found that a state statute gov-
erning appellate review of multitheory general verdicts applied
in place of the Baldwin principle, indicating that statutes super-
sede the common-law rule.225 The Supreme Court itself has used
§ 2111 to supersede precedent that required automatic reversal
223 This rule would not dismiss case-by-case determinations. There will be instances
in which legal errors should be upheld and factual errors should be reversed. This ap-
proach would inform courts of instances in which errors will generally be either harmful
or harmless by looking at the natural effect of the error.
224 See note 35 and accompanying text.
225 See notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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of judgments in other contexts. In United States v Lane,226 the
Court held that a pre-§ 2111 case requiring automatic reversal
for misjoinders was displaced by the harmless error rules.227
Similar analysis should apply to Wilmington.228
The test for whether legislation supersedes federal common
law is simply whether the statute "'speak[s] directly to [the]
question' at issue."229 There is no requirement of a clear congres-
sional purpose for displacing federal common law.230 Here, the
harmless error rules explicitly speak to the issue of whether
harmless error analysis is required.
Although Wilmington would not be displaced if it included
harmless error analysis, the case does not include such analysis.
Indeed, the majority of lower courts recognize that the Wilming-
ton rule is absolute and does not contain harmless error analy-
sis. Those courts that have interpreted Wilmington to include a
harmless error exception by focusing on the references in Wil-
mington to "prejudicial error" and "vitally defective" errors231
have done so based on improper reasoning. While the Wilming-
ton Court found the error to be "prejudicial," such a statement
would not pass muster under a harmless error test. Harmless
error analysis requires that courts assess how the submitted
theories affected the substantial rights of any parties.232 Wil-
mington did not engage in such analysis; instead, the Court cat-
egorically held that the error was prejudicial because of the gen-
erality of the verdict.233 It did not, as Baldwin did, evaluate the
226 474 US 438 (1986).
227 Id at 444-49 (rejecting the per se rule established in McElroy v United States,
164 US 76 (1896), in favor of harmless error analysis).
228 One commentator has argued that the harmless error rules incorporate the
Baldwin principle, and therefore would not alter its reasoning. See Phair, 4 J App Prac
& Process at 128-29, 133 (cited in note 162). The Supreme Court rejected this approach
in an analogous context, describing it as precluded by Kotteakos and Schaffer v United
States, 362 US 511 (1960). See Lane, 474 US at 448 n 11 ("It is simply too late in the day
to argue that Congress intended to incorporate any per se rule of McElroy for misjoinder
following Kotteakos, the subsequent enactment of an arguably broader statute, and this
Court's prejudice inquiry in Schaffer.").
229 American Electric Power Co v Connecticut, 131 S Ct 2527, 2537 (2011) (brackets
in original), quoting Mobil Oil Corp v Higginbotham, 436 US 618, 625 (1978).
230 American Electric Power, 131 S Ct at 2537.
231 See notes 157-59 and accompanying text. The "vitally defective" language is in
the context of interpreting an Illinois statute that allows a general verdict to be sus-
tained as long as one of the counts is sufficient. The Wilmington Court found that the stat-
ute does not apply to errors that are vitally defective. See note 34 and accompanying text.
232 28 US § 2111.
233 Wilmington, 205 US at 78.
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significance of the error. 2 4 Because the Wilmington Court did
not discuss the effect of the error, the Court did not apply harm-
less error analysis. Because Wilmington did not include harm-
less error analysis, the harmless error rules displace the Wil-
mington rule.
Other factors demonstrate that harmless error analysis
should be incorporated into courts' review of multitheory general
verdicts. Section 2111 specifies that the harmless error rule ap-
plies to "any case,"235 which would include civil cases involving
multitheory general verdicts, and FRCP 61 is specific to civil
cases. 236 More significantly, the Supreme Court has applied the
harmless error test to criminal cases involving multitheory gen-
eral verdicts,27 and the Court has also recognized that § 2111
applies to both civil and criminal cases in other contexts. 238 Fur-
thermore, the Court has implied that Kotteakos applies in civil
cases, 239 and has declared that "an 'absolute certainty' standard
is plainly inconsistent" with the Kotteakos standard.240 Since
Wilmington did not include a harmless error test, the Wilming-
ton rule should be replaced with harmless error analysis to re-
main consistent with the harmless error rules and Supreme
Court precedent.
234 See note 35 and accompanying text.
235 28 USC § 2111 (emphasis added).
236 Despite concerns, which will be discussed in more depth below, with citing Rule
61 to conduct harmless error analysis, the Rule supports the argument that harmless
error analysis supersedes Wilmington. First, even though the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure apply to district courts and not appellate courts, the Supreme Court has held that
"it is well settled that the appellate courts should act in accordance with the salutary
policy embodied in Rule 61." McDonough Power Equipment, Inc v Greenwood, 464 US
548, 554 (1984) (holding that Congress enacted § 2111 to reinforce the application of
Rule 61 to appellate courts). Second, two of the Baldwin-principle cases, despite coming
after Rule 61 was enacted, make no reference to it or any harmless error rule. While
these cases did not explicitly refer to a harmless error rule, both cases concerned legal
errors, and both cite to the fact that they are unable to tell if the jury relied on the inad-
equate theory. See Sunkist Growers, Inc v Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co, 370 US
19, 29-30 (1962); United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Assn v Halecki, 358
US 613, 618-19 (1959).
237 See, for example, Pulido, 129 S Ct at 532 (stating that in the context of a multithe-
ory claim, "various forms of instructional error are... subject to harmless-error review").
238 Kotteakos, 328 US at 762.
239 See note 96 and accompanying text.
240 Pulido, 129 S Ct at 533.
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2. Factual errors should be presumed harmless.
With harmless error analysis incorporated into the review of
multitheory general verdicts, the question remains as to when
factual errors are harmless. As previously noted, the harmless
error rules refer to errors that "do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties."241 The Supreme Court has instructed
courts to analyze "what effect the error had or reasonably may
be taken to have had upon the jury's decision."242 In cases in
which the jury handed down a multitheory general verdict, re-
viewing courts cannot tell what effect the error actually had.
Courts can, however, draw inferences regarding what effect the
error "reasonably may ... have had" based on the jurors' re-
sponsibilities.243 This Section argues that the practice of holding
factual errors presumptively harmful is contrary to current Su-
preme Court precedent. Instead, courts should presume that fac-
tual errors are harmless.244
There are four possible approaches reviewing courts could
take with respect to factual errors. The first approach would be
to hold that factual errors are always harmful because "the sub-
stantial rights of the parties would be affected per se if the court
ascribed the verdict to the valid claim."245 This approach is prem-
ised on the argument that the harmless error rules incorporate
Wilmington because both explicitly reference "substantial
rights."246 Such an approach cannot be accepted for several rea-
sons. First, it fails to address the main inquiry: whether the out-
come would be different in the absence of the error. More signifi-
cantly, this interpretation of the harmless error rules ignores
the statute's motivation, which was aimed at preventing unnec-
essary reversals.247 As discussed in the paragraph below, the
Court has repeatedly rejected rules that find a harmful error
when none existed.
241 28 USC § 2111.
242 Kotteakos, 328 US at 764.
243 Id.
244 The Supreme Court has found that "any attempt to create a generalized pre-
sumption to apply in all cases would be contrary ... to the spirit" of § 2111, and there-
fore has cautioned against making broad, rule-based presumptions. Id at 765. However,
it has also noted that a permissible presumption would be based on the "nature of the
error and 'its natural effect."' Id at 765-66 (emphasis added). This Comment's approach
is based on such a permissible presumption.
245 Phair, 4 J App Prac & Process at 127-29 (quotation marks omitted) (cited in note 162).
246 Id.
247 See note 84 and accompanying text.
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A second view is that factual errors should be presumed
harmful. The Supreme Court has eschewed such a position in an
analogous situation. In a recent civil case, the Court criticized
the Federal Circuit for imposing a mandatory presumption that
errors were harmful.248 While the case involved the Veterans
Court, which has its own harmless error statute,249 the Supreme
Court also discussed § 2111. Citing Kotteakos, the Court noted
that it has interpreted § 2111 to require courts to assess errors
"without the use of presumptions insofar as those presumptions
may lead courts to find an error harmful, when, in fact, . . . it is
not."250 There are numerous instances in which factual errors
have been found harmless in the context of multitheory general
verdicts.251 A presumption of harmfulness in those cases would
have led many of those courts to reverse the verdicts. The re-
viewing court would need evidence that the jury did not rely on
the inadequate theory to overcome a presumption of harmful-
ness. Given the nature of general verdicts, the court would not
be able to tell what theories the jury relied on.252 Absent some
indication that the jury did not rely on the inadequate theory,
the court could not be sufficiently confident that the error did
not alter the outcome. With insufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of harmfulness, the court would have to conclude
the error was harmful. This runs contrary to the harmless error
rules as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Courts therefore
should not presume that factual errors are harmful.
Courts could, as a third approach, find that factual errors
are always harmless. One circuit court has done this, holding
that factual errors are harmless as a matter of law.253 The rea-
son for this ruling follows the Griffin rationale: jurors are re-
sponsible for making factual findings. If a theory is inadequate
because of insufficient evidence, the jury will not base its verdict
on that theory.254 Thus, the outcome would not have been different
if the inadequate theory was not submitted to the jury, making the
248 Shinseki v Sanders, 556 US 396, 406 (2009).
249 38 USC § 7261(b)(2).
250 Shinseki, 556 US at 407-08 (emphasis added), citing Kotteakos, 328 US at 760.
251 See, for example, Davis v Rennie, 264 F3d 86, 105-07 (1st Cir 2001); Braun v
Flynt, 731 F2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir 1984); American Airlines, 418 F2d at 195.
252 See Baldwin, 112 US at 493.
253 See Buhrmaster v Overnite Transportation Co, 61 F3d 461, 463-64 (6th Cir 1995).
254 Id at 464. See also Griffin, 502 US 46, 59-60 (1957).
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error harmless. This approach "may go too far,"255 since courts
have found instances when factual errors were harmful.256
A final approach-and the one this Comment advocates-
would recognize that factual errors can be harmful, but should
be presumed harmless. Under this approach, an error is harm-
ful, and therefore requires reversal, if it is shown that the jury
"probably was confused.257 If the law given to the jury was cor-
rect and the jury makes factual findings, the only concern is
"surplusage," meaning a matter that is irrelevant to the case. 258
Courts can reasonably presume that adding a factually unsup-
ported claim would not alter the outcome since the jury would
recognize the lack of evidentiary support. 25 9
This presumption finds support in Supreme Court prece-
dent. The Griffin Court expressly invoked this inference in de-
scribing the "clear line" that separates factual errors and legal
errors:
When [ ] jurors have been left the option of relying upon a
legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that
their own intelligence and expertise will save them from
that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they
have been left the option of relying upon a factually inade-
quate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the
evidence.260
Thus, courts should infer that jurors can "save them[selves]"
from factual errors.261 In other words, jurors will recognize a fac-
tually unsupported theory of liability and will not rely on it. The
factual error will have no effect on the jury's decision and there-
fore is harmless.262 While Griffin was a criminal case, there is no
reason to think that fact-finding capabilities differ between
criminal juries and civil juries, as this Comment will discuss.263
Therefore, courts should employ a rebuttable presumption that
factual errors are harmless.
255 See Eastern Trading, 229 F3d at 621-22.
256 See, for example, Asbill, 726 F2d at 1504 (reversing a verdict even when the er-
ror consisted of insufficient evidence to support two of the three claims).
257 Eastern Trading, 229 F3d at 621-22.
258 Id.
259 See, for example, American Airlines, 418 F2d at 195.
260 Griffin, 502 US at 59-60 (emphasis omitted).
261 Id at 59.
262 See Kotteakos, 328 US at 764.
263 See Part III.C.
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This approach is further supported by the fact that lower
courts have loosely followed this presumption. In the cases that
apply harmless error analysis, the majority of courts have up-
held verdicts involving factual errors. 264 Even in instances in
which the court finds that a legal error is harmless, it is often
based on the presumption that juries can reject factually inade-
quate theories.265
Furthermore, the concerns from Baldwin do not apply be-
cause courts can infer that juries reject factually unsupported
theories. The principal problem for the Baldwin Court was that
the nature of multitheory general verdicts prevents courts from
determining what theories the jury relied on.266 Because juries
generally do not rely on theories that have insufficient evidence,
courts can uphold the grounds for the jury's decision despite the
generality of the verdict. With the motivating factor behind
Baldwin absent for factual errors, a different rule should control.
Finally, the allocation of burdens weighs in favor of presum-
ing harmlessness instead of harmfulness for factual errors. The
burden of showing that an error is harmful typically falls on the
party seeking reversal.267 That party will often be in the best po-
sition to explain how he or she has been hurt by the error,268 and
the general rule is to place the burden with the party who has
easier access to relevant information.269 The Wilmington rule
flips this by presuming prejudice for any error in a multitheory
general verdict, meaning the burden is now on the party oppos-
ing reversal to show that the error was in fact harmless. Pre-
suming that factual errors are harmless, on the other hand, puts
the burden where it properly lies since the party requesting re-
versal will have to show that the error was harmful.
With factual errors presumed to be harmless, the civil rule
would follow the analysis of the common-law criminal rule out-
lined in Griffin. This Comment does not argue that factual er-
rors are always harmless, only that they should be presumed
264 See note 251. But see Asbill, 726 F2d at 1504.
266 See, for example, Hurley v Atlantic City Police Dept, 174 F3d 95, 121-22 (3d Cir
1999) (holding that the instruction on quid pro quo was legally erroneous, but the error
was harmless because there was not sufficient factual support for the theory so the jury
did not rely on it); Bruneau v South Kortright Central School District, 163 F3d 749, 760
(2d Cir 1998).
266 Baldwin, 112 US at 494.
267 See Shinseki, 556 US at 410.
268 See id.
269 See United States v Fior D'Italia, Inc, 536 US 238, 256 n 4 (2002) (Souter dissenting).
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harmless. There might be instances in which the jury is actually
confused by unsupported theories of liability, so harmful errors
could occur. But this is still functionally equivalent to the com-
mon-law criminal rule. The common-law criminal rule relied on
a presumption that the verdict was based on adequate grounds.
The Supreme Court noted that this presumption could be rebut-
ted by evidence showing otherwise.270 Since Griffin, some lower
courts have reversed criminal convictions when there was evi-
dence that the jury convicted on the factually inadequate theo-
ry.271 Thus, both civil and criminal verdicts would be reversed
under the harmless error analysis if evidence rebutted the pre-
sumption of harmlessness.
B. Convergence of Criminal and Civil Law
The civil rule under the harmless error analysis should be
functionally equivalent to the common-law criminal rule. Even
though Wilmington recognized a civil-criminal divide in dicta,
this alone should not preclude the convergence between criminal
and civil appellate review of general verdicts. The civil-criminal
division is not inherent in the law, and the Supreme Court itself
has mixed criminal case law in civil cases.
The convergence between the civil and criminal rules is not
a recent development. Even before the formation of the United
States, judges were declaring that the civil-criminal divide was
normatively undesirable. In an early English civil case, Lord
Mansfield noted the division between criminal and civil appel-
late review of general verdicts.272 He lamented that the rule in
civil cases was to reverse the verdict if any one of the counts was
bad, because it "catch[es] justice in a net of form.273 He instead
thought that the criminal rule, in which a verdict can be upheld
if any of the counts supports the verdict, should be applied in
civil cases.274 Lord Mansfield went on to write that the consider-
ation of the rule in criminal cases "will make the Court lean
against setting aside a verdict upon such an objection without
270 See Claassen v United States, 142 US 140, 146 (1891). See also Griffin, 502 US at
49-50, quoting Claassen, 142 US at 146-47 (observing that the presumption exists "in
the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary").
271 See, for example, United States v Henning, 286 F3d 914, 922 (6th Cir 2002) (find-
ing that it was likely that the jury convicted the defendant based on the actions of his
associates, for which there was insufficient evidence).
272 Peake v Oldham, 98 Eng Rep 1083, 1083-84 (KB 1775) (Mansfield).
273 Id at 1084.
274 Id.
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very good reason, that is, without some apparent manifest de-
fect."27-5 He later wrote in a separate opinion that he saw no need
to distinguish between criminal and civil cases. 276 Thus, even
though early courts recognized that there were differences be-
tween criminal cases and civil cases, some judges questioned
whether such a distinction was legitimate and were influenced
by the other line of cases.
As further evidence of convergence, the Supreme Court has
mixed civil law cases with criminal cases, and vice versa. The
Stromberg Court, although not citing a civil law case, used the
same rationale the Court previously used in civil cases. The
Court justified invalidating the general verdict in part because it
could not determine whether the appellant was convicted under
the unconstitutional clause.277 The Court's ruling contravened
the traditional common-law criminal presumption that the ver-
dict rested on the good theory, and instead followed the Baldwin
rationale that "[the verdict's] generality prevents us from per-
ceiving upon which plea [the jury] found."278 Stromberg therefore
blurred the line between civil and criminal law.
The Court has also applied criminal precedent to civil cases
in other contexts in which the basis for a general verdict was
unknown. In New York Times Co v Sullivan,279 Sullivan, a
Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel
suit against the New York Times and was awarded a verdict of
$500,000.280 The Supreme Court held that public officials could
constitutionally recover damages for libel against critics of their
official conduct only on proof of actual malice.281 Although the
relevant Alabama law required proof of malice for punitive
damages, the trial judge did not have the jury specify which por-
tions of award were compensatory or punitive. This made it "im-
possible to know, in view of the general verdict returned,"
whether the jury found actual malice.22 The Court reversed and
remanded the case, citing criminal cases, including Stromberg
275 Id.
276 Grant v Astle, 99 Eng Rep 459, 466 (KB 1781) (Mansfield).
277 Stromberg, 283 US at 367-68.
278 Baldwin, 112 US at 493.
279 376 US 254 (1964).
280 Id at 256.
281 Id at 283.
282 Id at 284.
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and Yates, as authorities.23 Thus, the Supreme Court has used
criminal law in civil cases to reverse a general verdict.
These examples show that the civil-criminal divide is not an
inherent division. Indeed, when the civil and criminal rules are
the same-as is the case with the Stromberg rule and the Bald-
win principle-courts should follow the Sullivan Court's lead
and cite the other side's cases. Because the harmless error rules
create the same rule for all factual errors, courts can, and
should, cite to criminal law in civil cases. As the next Section
explains, courts should specifically apply the law articulated in
Griffin.
C. Griffin Should Control in Civil Cases
Since there should no longer be a civil-criminal divide, Grif-
fin should apply in civil cases. The rationale in Griffin applies in
civil and criminal cases. The ability of jurors to weigh evidence,
and their inability to understand the law, is the same whether
the case is civil or criminal. Although "civil and criminal juries'
required roles are obviously not identical,284 in the context of
this Comment, the required roles are the same. The only differ-
ence in decisional authority between criminal and civil juries is
the criminal jury's authority to apply legal rules: generally
speaking, criminal juries have the power to apply legal rules in
deciding verdicts, whereas civil juries do not. 285 However, civil
juries have the power to apply legal rules through general ver-
dicts,286 and this Comment focuses exclusively on general ver-
dicts. Civil juries giving general verdicts operate the same as
criminal juries; both decide the facts, are given the law, and ap-
ply the law to the facts to reach an ultimate conclusion. As such,
any difference in decisional authority between civil and criminal
juries should not affect any of this Comment's analysis. Addi-
tionally, fact-finding is the same for civil and criminal juries.287
This means that the reasoning in Griffin, which was based on
jurors' fact-finding capabilities, applies equally to criminal and
civil juries. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Stromberg
used the rationale from Baldwin to reverse a general verdict in a
283 New York Times, 376 US at 284.
284 United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 516-17 (1995).
285 Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Crimi-
nal Juries, 61 Geo Wash L Rev 723, 740 (1993).
286 Id at 736.
287 Id at 740.
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criminal case. Similarly, a court could use the rationale from
Griffin to uphold a general verdict in a civil case.
While there are countless other differences between crimi-
nal and civil cases, many differences actually support applying
Griffin to civil cases in place of Wilmington. For example, be-
cause the stakes are higher in criminal proceedings,288 courts
should be more cautious in upholding verdicts in criminal pro-
ceedings. Nonetheless, Wilmington calls for the opposite result.
Though the standard of proof is different in civil and crimi-
nal cases, this point actually supports abandoning Wilmington
in favor of Griffin. In criminal cases, defendants must be found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,89 while most civil cases re-
quire only a preponderance of the evidence.290 Because criminal
cases require a higher standard of evidence, verdicts in criminal
cases should be easier to reverse based on insufficient evidence
relative to civil cases. In fact, the Supreme Court has said, "the
fact that the Government must prove its case beyond a reasona-
ble doubt justifies a rule that makes it more difficult for the re-
viewing court to find that an error did not affect the outcome of a
case.291 If verdicts can be upheld despite factual errors in crimi-
nal cases, then it should also be the case that they can be upheld
in civil cases. Instead, Wilmington creates the opposite result.
Lower courts should apply Griffin in civil cases. Because the
civil-criminal divide has been bridged, Griffin should be binding
authority on lower courts in civil cases, and thus courts should
follow the Tenth and Federal Circuits' lead and treat it as the
relevant rule.292
D. Clarifying the Rule Governing Appellate Review
With the convergence of criminal and civil rules and the ap-
plication of Griffin to civil cases, there should be a single rule
that applies in both civil and criminal cases: legal errors-
incorrect instruction on the law or improper admission of evi-
dence-are reversible unless harmless; factual errors-
288 Joel Prentiss Bishop, 1 Criminal Procedure § 1273 at 756 (Little, Brown 3d ed
1880). See also Baxter v Palmigiano, 425 US 308, 318-19 (1976) (noting that "the stakes
are higher" in criminal cases).
289 Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 277-78 (1993).
290 Neil Orloff and Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-
of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U Pa L Rev 1159, 1159 (1983).
291 Shinseki, 556 US at 410-11.
292 See notes 197-205 and accompanying text (describing the Tenth and Federal
Circuits' approach).
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insufficient evidence-are upheld unless harmful, if there is at
least one adequate theory. This is already the rule on the crimi-
nal side, and the Tenth and Federal Circuits have embraced this
rule on the civil side.293 By helping courts understand the natu-
ral effect of different types of errors, this rule would resolve the
two sources of confusion in the case law: whether and how harm-
less error analysis applies and whether Griffin is controlling in
civil cases.
First, this rule informs courts that the harmless error ex-
ception applies, so reversal is not automatic and courts are not
required to be "absolutely certain" that the jury relied on the in-
adequate theory. This uniform rule also provides context for us-
ing the harmless error exception based on the error type. As
noted earlier, factual errors should be presumed harmless, so
the harmless error exception dictates upholding the verdict.294
Legal errors are also subject to the harmless error rule, but be-
cause jurors are not experts on the law, the presumption for le-
gal errors is to reverse. This rule roughly maps what the lower
courts have held. Many cases with harmless errors involved fac-
tual errors,295 whereas many cases in which the court declined to
find the error harmless involved legal errors.296 The proposed
uniform rule would help lower courts understand exactly when
and why an exception applies and would correct those instances
when the court should have come out the other way.
Second, the convergence of civil and criminal law means
that courts are free to rely on Griffin in civil cases. It is appro-
priate for courts not only to apply the rationale from Griffin ex-
plaining the role of jurors, as some courts have done, but to cite
Griffin as the binding rule. However, Griffin should be applied
only in cases involving factual errors, and not for legal errors as
some lower courts have done.297 Lower courts should also not cite
Wilmington to deny applying Griffin. Furthermore, lower courts
should not cite Wilmington for the proposition that factual errors
293 See notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
294 See Part III.A.2.
295 See note 251.
296 See, for example, Morrissey, 544 F2d at 27 (declining to find an error harmless
when the judge failed to define "discipline"). But see Hurley, 174 F3d at 122 (finding that
an erroneous instruction of law was harmless); Asbill, 726 F2d at 1504 (reversing a ver-
dict despite the error being factual-namely, insufficient evidence to support two of the
three claims).
297 See, for example, Banc One Capital Partners Corp v Kneipper, 67 F3d 1187,
1195-96 (5th Cir 1995).
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are reversible without conducting harmless error analysis, since
the harmless error rules displaced the Wilmington rule.
CONCLUSION
This Comment sheds light on the confusion lower courts
have been facing in reviewing multitheory general verdicts.
Courts are uncertain about the circumstances under which a
general verdict can be upheld and whether they can apply Grif-
fin to civil cases. This Comment resolves this confusion by ana-
lyzing the legal development on both the civil and criminal sides
and synthesizing them into a single rule that cuts across the civ-
il-criminal divide: legal errors should be reversed subject to
harmless error analysis while factual errors should be upheld
unless prejudicial. This rule explains both the movement by the
Supreme Court on the criminal side toward the civil rule and the
reaction by the lower courts on the civil side. Moreover, § 2111
replaces the Wilmington rule with harmless error analysis,
which matches the common-law criminal rule. This establishes
the complete convergence between civil and criminal case law,
meaning that courts are free to apply criminal cases such as
Griffin in civil cases, but only in instances of the same type of
error. With the analysis in this Comment, courts should be in a
better position to understand the state of the rule with respect
to reviewing multitheory general verdicts and when it should
apply.
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